Risto Rinne, Mikko Aro, Joel Kivirauma & Hannu Simola

ADOLESCENT FACING THE EDUCATIONAL POLITICS OF THE 21st CENTURY:

Comparative Survey on Five National Cases and Three Welfare Models

Adolescent facing the educational politics of the 21st century

Suomen Kasvatustieteellinen Seura
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Risto Rinne, Mikko Aro, Joel Kiviranta & Hannu Simola (eds.)

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PREFACE

This book is part of the comparative research project *Education Governance and Social Inclusion and Exclusion in Europe* (EGSIE: cf. Popkewitz, Lindblad & Strandberg 1999; Lindblad & Popkewitz 1999; Simola et al.1999). The purpose of the research was to study changing educational policy and governance in eight European countries and Australia, and the connection of these changes to social exclusion and inclusion. Some results of this comparative research have also been published in the concluding report of the EGSIE-project (Rinne, Kivirauma, Aro & Simola 2001; see also Aro, Rinne & Kivirauma 2002).

Although some of the titles might suggest otherwise, in this book the point of view is strictly quantitative, using survey data. We intend to examine the opinions of the youth, reflecting the contemporary transition of states in the direction of neo-liberalism, within the framework of welfare state models. Our respondents are approximately 15-year-old youngsters leaving compulsory school in five countries with three different welfare-model traditions. The countries concerned are Australia (liberal welfare state model), Spain and Portugal (conservative welfare state model) and Finland and Sweden (Nordic welfare state model).

Without solid international co-operation this kind of comparative research would have, of course, been impossible. We want to express our deep gratitude to all those heavily involved in this comparative research. They are in the case of Australia: Sharon Cooper, Thomas Griffiths and James Ladwig (University of Newcastle), in the case of Portugal: Natália Alves (University of Lisbon), in the case of Spain:

Pablo Castillo, Magdalena Jiménez, Mónica Torres and Miguel Pereyra (University of Granada), and in the case of Sweden: Joakim Lindgren and Lisbeth Lundahl (Umeå University). We also want to express our gratitude to the research team at the University of Turku, Finland. Senior assistant Tero Järvinen with his sharp view on youth research was strongly involved in formulating the questionnaire. Lecturer David Bergen improved the text by checking the English language. Of course we also want to thank those pupils who participated in the survey – naturally this study would not have been possible without them. Last but not least, we want to thank the whole EGSIE-group, especially Sverker Lindblad for his strict discipline and theoretical understanding.

1. Introduction

The global rise of neoliberal educational policy

The social, political and economic shifts that are propelling post-industrial societies have their origins in the 1970s, when the oil crisis shook the world economy (Brown & Lauder 1997). A couple of decades later, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall put an end to the Cold War and silenced the loudest voices of ideological controversy in Europe. The deep economic depression at the beginning of the 1990s increased the momentum. The strengthening global economic competition with only one market-driven voice of consensus among businesses, nation states and political regions has produced massive restructuring and political change in the entire role of the state, and in its function to produce and allocate welfare and human capital. The European Union has come to be viewed as the inspiration of the common success story of the European region in its struggle for power and prosperity against the far-reaching strong economies of the United States and the Far East. In the spirit of the European Union, the geographical, economic, political and ideological barriers between nation states have become blurred. In fact, the idea of nation states as autonomous units and subjects is being questioned. Money, workforces, people and products are free to cross borders. Is there any longer a need to retain the nation states in the traditional sense? Would it be better to concentrate the economic and political power on the Union institutions, the banks, the global market and transnational enterprises?

The significant changes of the 1980s and 1990s have not been only economic and political. Multinational organisations, such as the OECD, the World Bank and the European Union have also strengthened their grip on the fields of labour policy, social policy, health care and educational policy. They have published a wealth of declarations and recommendations, and they have developed more and more all-embracing evaluation systems to compare and rank the welfare policies of nation states. "Education at a Glance" and "Key Data on Education" are examples of the instruments by which modern politicians are able to steer national education policies and assess their effectiveness.

However, the transnational steering mechanisms of national educational policies are not only in the hands of the European regime, or subject only to its intentional wishes. The transnational changes in educational policies have more to do with global changes and trends in the world economy, the rise of the network society and the information age, and the profound changes in world culture in post-modern society. Phillip Brown (1997) introduces the concept of "third wave" in educational policy. This third wave arose largely from the disappointments brought about by meritocratic educational ideology. Belief in the fairness of the meritocratic educational game began to wane on both the left and the right in the late 1980s and in the 1990s. Simultaneously, the deep economic recession and widespread unemployment, especially among young people, forced nation states and their politicians and citizens to evaluate educational policy in quite a new light. The third wave meant a solid shift away from meritocratic towards *parentocratic* ideology, in which (ibid 393-394):

> *".a child's education is increasingly dependent upon the wealth and wishes of parents rather than the ability and efforts of the pupils."*

This shift is characterised by large educational reform programmes with slogans such as "parental choice", "free market" and "educational standards". These are accompanied by more neo-liberal dilemmas, such as heavier competition between individuals and schools, more diversified school systems, privatisation, school autonomy, deregulation and decentralisation, the managerialism of administration, slump budget funding, funding by results, and stricter evaluation. This new, world-

wide "neo-liberal educational policy" has many names. One of the most important things to realise is that this movement of "politics of school choice" has much in common with the neo-liberal ideology of freedom, combined more strictly than before with the economy and education. In the western world this may be labelled "the marketisation of education", or "economic rationalism of educational policy" (cf. Whitty 1998; House 1998; Chubb & Moe 1990; Morken & Formicola 1999; Rinne 2000, 138-139; Kivirauma & Rinne 2000).

The neo-liberal drift seems to have taken over most of the post-industrialised world in the late 1990s. The Golden Age of the strong welfare state with its solidarity, broad responsibility and care for its members seems to be long gone everywhere, and the crisis of the welfare state appears finally to have become reality. Social-welfare retrenchment is taking place in most countries, even in the "nest" of social democracy, the Nordic region. The debate is no longer about whether the welfare state should be expanded or cut down, but rather about *how* it is going to be rolled back (see Esping-Andersen 1996, 3).

Welfare state models and approaches to solidarity

Following Richard Titmuss' (1958) pioneering contribution there have been intense efforts to work out solid welfare state classifications. Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999) is one of the best-known authors to contribute to the theory, outlining three welfare-state models. The three models of the welfare state are profoundly based on prevailing models of solidarity in the distribution of risks in society. These risks may be class risks, life-course risks or intergenerational risks. The agent taking the responsibility for them may be the market, the family or the state. Esping-Andersen calls the modes of solidarity the residual approach, the corporative approach and the universalistic approach. He refers to welfare models that are strongly built on the solidarity models as the liberal welfare regime, the conservative welfare regime and the social-democratic welfare regime.

Although extremely popular, Esping-Andersen's typology has also been strongly criticized. On the one hand, it has been argued that real-world welfare states do not fit well into the ideal-typical regimes (e.g.

Julkunen 1992, 340) and that regime thinking gives an overly simplified and static view of welfare states (Daly 1997, 145). On the other hand, it has been argued that Esping-Andersen's original theory does not take into account family and gender-related differences (e.g. Pascall & Manning 2000, 241).

It is true that the welfare state typology simplifies the world, but then again, that is what theory is normally supposed to do. Theories and typologies are used precisely due to the fact that the real world is overly complicated.

When it comes to the family and gender-related critique, Esping-Andersen has himself responded to it. In his recent book (1999, 47) Esping-Andersen admits his neglect of the importance of the family in *"The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism"*. Now he emphasises the importance of "de-familialization", which means decreasing family dependence, as the basis of welfare state categorization. He concludes, however, that his re-examination of the welfare state typology based on new analyses by and large confirms the validity of the original trichotomy. (1999, 44-51, 60-72.)

The countries in question could be classified according to their educational systems as well as based on the welfare-state categorisation. We prefer the latter alternative here. In the former case, school admission policies and education governance (see Green et. al 1999; Seppänen 2001) would have been examined as the basis of the categorisation.

However, welfare-state regimes and educational systems do match up rather strongly, generally speaking. The liberal welfare states are too diverse to go into details, but the Australian educational system has been characterised by the mix of public and state responsibility and centralisation at the state level (Beswick & Harman 1984, 29). On the other hand, enrolments in private schools have lately been clearly on the rise (Potts 1998). The conservative welfare states have generally been predominantly selective in their admission policies and centralised at either the national or the regional level. Until the beginning of the 1990s the educational systems in Spain and Portugal were selective (Green et al. 1999), but since then there have been efforts towards the "comprehensivisation" of the school system in both countries. Possibly the most drastic changes in educational policy in the 1990s have taken place in those countries

characterised as social-democratic welfare states. True to the ideologies of egalitarianism and equal opportunities, the educational systems of the social democratic welfare states have been epitomised by the comprehensive school and the abolishment of streaming by ability.

In his recent book, Esping-Andersen (1999, 170-178) goes as far as to dress his welfare regimes in the clothes of "three ideal typical homines: Homo liberalismus, Homo familius and Homo socialdemocratius". *Homo liberalismus* resembles Mister Economics and follows no other ideal but his own personal-welfare calculator. In his world those who can play in the market may do so, and those who cannot have to turn to charity. In the world of *Homo familius* one has to sacrifice everything for one's collective family. Even patriarchy disappears. Stability and security count. A job for life is heaven on earth. Homo familius wants a welfare regime that tames the market and exalts the virtues of close-knit solidarity. *Homo socialdemocratius* "is, like a boy scout or a good Christian, inclined to believe that he will do better when everybody does better " (ibid 171). He does not like free-riders. He loves the idea that we are all equal and hates the idea that someone might rise above others.

Liberal model, residual approach

In the so-called residual solidarity approach the welfare state limits its aid to "them", "the bad risks", the demonstrably poor and the disabled, while the majority of "us" can turn to private services and insurance schemes. As far as education is concerned, it is not the duty of the state to offer the same level of educational services to all the people free of charge, but to segregate the educational system and enhance private services. This kind of liberal welfare model has been strong in countries such as the United Kingdom, the USA, Canada and lately New Zealand.

Australia can nowadays also be characterised as a prime example of Esping-Andersen's liberal welfare state. Still, it resembles the social-democratic countries in many respects. The power of the political left and of the trade unions has been formidable, and thus working-class mobilisation has been high. These factors did not lead to universalistic social policy, however, as they did in the Nordic countries, but were rather channelled into a labour policy emphasising full employment.

Castles (1989) calls this "Welfare by other means" – despite a strong political left, the welfare state remained comparatively weak. The preservation of full employment was pursued by means of industrial arbitration, protectionist trade policies and wage flexibility.

The ideology of egalitarianism has been central both in the Nordic countries and in Australia. For migrants, Australia was the country of the "fair go", where anybody could make it by working hard. This target of egalitarianism was pursued in different ways: whereas Sweden and Finland resorted to welfare policies, Australia put her trust in "workfare" (see Castles 1989). Having said this, in the 1970s and 1980s Australia also made a considerable effort to move towards universalistic social policy, most notably during the Whitlam years. Between 1972 and 1976, social expenditure rose from 12.5 to 17.6 per cent of the GDP. The trend was reversed, however, when the rightist Fraser government came to power after the dismissal of Whitlam[1]. Although the next Labour governments made an attempt at moving back towards universalistic social policies with the restoration of the Labour health-insurance scheme, for example (Castles 1989, 22-23), it could nevertheless be argued that the later Labour governments stepped back from the more "socialistic" leanings of the Whitlam era.

On the other hand, capitalism has never really been challenged in Australia. Due to the late birth of the nation, it could be said she was born capitalist. To further add to the picture of Australia as a country of contradictions, the educational system in particular has been quite strongly affected by Catholicism. Most significantly, the non-public schools in Australia are predominantly Catholic. Due to successful lobbying by the Catholic interest groups, much of their funding is tax-based, however (Ladwig, Griffiths, Gore & Lingard 1999, 27), making the difference between public and non-public schools more or less fluid.

[1] Gough Whitlam, the Labour Party's prime minister, had the questionable honour of being dismissed in late 1975 by the governor general, the Queen's representative in Australia.

Conservative model, corporative approach

In the second, corporative approach, risks are pooled according to status. Professional status usually entails the same kinds of risks and the same kind of primary sources of social closure and collective mobilisation in society. The segmentation of society may also be strong in terms of social benefits and services based historically on the old division of labour between manual and non-manual work. The role of the family and the church in promoting welfare, and especially in preventing life-course risks, is central. At the heart of the conservative welfare model is the blend of status segmentation and familialism. In the field of education the conservative model may lead to the segregation of schooling services on the grounds of professional will and the ability to invest in different educational branches. Germany, France and Italy are typical examples of this model, but countries such as Spain and Portugal are also included.

Spain and Portugal are perhaps not quite at the core of any particular welfare-state regime, but they may well be placed on the conservative side because they have many more characteristics in common with the conservative welfare state regime than with the others (Esping-Andersen 1999). Sometimes they are singled out as a fourth welfare-state model of their own, because of their rather low income levels and rather high unemployment rates, but here we will stick with Esping-Andersen's three-fold typology. Core features of these countries include a strong emphasis on the family as the central social unit, the heavy influence of the Catholic Church, and a comparatively weak welfare state. The welfare-state regimes are not static, however. In terms of expenditure, the Portuguese welfare state grew particularly rapidly during 1990–1993 (EC 1998, 66-67).

According to Esping-Andersen (1990), conservative welfare states typically have different systems catering for the needs of each social class. They are conservative in the sense that the preservation of status differentials is an important characteristic. In practice, this shows up in occupation-specific social insurance systems, for example. As a consequence, the middle classes are included. However, to put it bluntly, the insurance-type systems tend to cater mainly to the middle classes, while the working classes have to be satisfied with means-tested benefits.

The conservative welfare states, as mentioned above, are shaped mainly by their emphasis on upholding class-based status differences and the influence of the Church (Esping-Andersen 1990, 27).

It could be argued that one of the reasons why the welfare state developed less strongly in Catholic than in Protestant countries has to do with the social doctrine of Catholicism, which did not recognise needs as the basis of rights (van Kersbergen 1994). As van Kersbergen notes, charity was always religious by nature rather than an instrument of social policy. Its main purpose was to offer deliverance for the giver, not to relieve poverty or inequality. In this context, it could be assumed that solidarity towards pupils in difficulties would be less high in the predominantly Catholic countries.

Any comparison between Northern European social-democratic and Southern European conservative welfare states should take into account at least three very important factors affecting socialisation in the countries concerned. The first one is obviously religion. Protestantism and Catholicism emphasise different issues. The second factor, related to the first, is the juxtaposition of state and family. The third, one that Esping-Andersen (1990) also uses as an explanatory factor in his welfare-state typology, is the heritage of democracy vs. absolutism. Of the five countries investigated, Sweden and Australia have the longest period of democratic rule, followed by Finland. The long-standing authoritarian regime in Portugal fell as recently as in 1974, and in Spain, Franco's rule ended soon after in 1975 (see e.g. Nóvoa et al. 1999; Pereyra, Sevilla & Castillo 1999).

Social-democratic model, universalistic approach

The third approach to solidarity can be called the universalistic approach. The premise is to pool "all the individual risks, bad or good, under one umbrella" (Esping-Andersen 1999, 41). All the risks should be shared universally. Health-care systems, educational systems and pensions should involve everyone. In the field of education the educational good should be allocated free of charge as far as economically possible to everyone according to his/her capacities and needs. The welfare-state model arising from this model of solidarity is known as the Nordic or social-democratic welfare model and it includes the Scandinavian countries.

Sweden and Finland are representatives of the social-democratic welfare-state regime. The social democratic model has traditionally been characterised by universalistic social policy, the prevalence of insurance-type social benefits and a strong, tax-funded public-service sector. In short, social-democratic welfare states could be characterised as service-heavy, but also as strongly geared towards income re-distribution. They have gone to great pains to include the middle classes in the system in order to reduce the risk of what is often called "welfare backlash" (see Korpi 1983, 193-194). The concept refers to the legitimacy of the welfare state: it could deteriorate if large groups of people only act as payers in the system, but do not receive social benefits themselves. Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999) identifies working-class mobilisation, Protestantism (the absence of Catholicism) and the absence of absolutism as the main driving forces behind the development of social democratic-type welfare systems.

It could be argued that the same characteristics listed above (Protestantism and the power of the political Left) have also affected the development of the educational systems of the respective countries. This Protestant heritage and strong working-class mobilisation has meant that education has also been used as a spearhead in increasing social equality and reducing class-based differences. The key concept in both fields in the social-democratic welfare states has been solidarity.

Themes and structure of the book

There are basically two kinds of approaches to international research. Firstly, there are case studies, which have a rich variety of details, but may fall short in the comparative aspect. Secondly, there are outright comparative studies, which stress the comparisons at the cost of details.

This book is mainly a collection of case studies. The starting point was to give a voice to different "stories", as told by the youth living in different societal environments. Each story has been built on the basis of different national contexts, and thus somewhat different issues have been stressed in the case studies. This approach, while giving voice to individual researchers from different countries and adding details, necessarily weakens the comparability of the results. To compensate

for this, in the final chapter (5. Making Ends Meet/A Comparative Look) some of the most essential issues are examined in a comparative fashion.

Structure. The articles are organised in three main parts. The first part (*Narratives, myths and sagas*) includes descriptions of pupils' faith in education and their opinions on the effects of family in today's world. Also, opinions regarding globalisation and the integration of Europe are mapped. In the second part (*Subject construction*) we deal with citizenship in the labour market and in the political and the educational fields. In the third part (*Governance and social inclusion and exclusion*), the variables related to social inclusion and exclusion are taken up.

The operationalisation of exclusion. Exclusion and inclusion are very abstract concepts, which makes them problematic in empirical research. Abstract concepts have to be brought down to earth, which poses many problems but is nevertheless necessary. In our case, the concrete grassroots-level questions related to exclusion deal with the youths' self-confidence, respect among peers, and consumption possibilities. In addition, the youths were asked what factors are in their opinion related to exclusion. (see Appendix 1/The Questionnaire, questions 21–23.) Do they think that exclusion is mainly related to social structures, or do they think it is up to the individuals whether they fails or succeed?

Themes. We have addressed the following general questions in different sections of the articles:

I Narratives, sagas, myths

- What are the experiences of schooling among different categories of adolescents in terms of their roles, relations and activities in school?
  - Belief in education
  - Opinions on solidarity and equality in school
  - Competitiveness, school choice
- What is role of the family compared to other competing socialising agents?
- What kind of views do the youths have about the advantages and disadvantages of globalisation in general, and especially concerning the European Union?

II Subject construction

- What are the youths' conceptions of themselves as individuals like, in terms of identity, self-evaluation and efficiency in the realisation of life projects?
- How do their social and cultural positions and resources affect their perceptions of their opportunities to participate in social life?

III Governance, social inclusion and exclusion

- What options do the youths think are open for them on their pathways through education, work and life?
  - Educational and occupational plans
  - Self-reliance
- What kind of things do they consider important for succeeding in life, and what do they regard as the central factors increasing the risk of exclusion?

Hypotheses. The initial assumptions concerning the differences between countries are largely based on the different institutional set-ups. The clearest differences can be expected to be found between the liberal model (Australia) and the social democratic model (Finland and Sweden). The latter has been built on the basis of the ideas of social equality and solidarity, whereas market mentality has ruled in the former (although in the case of Australia, this is somewhat of an over-simplification). The youth in the Nordic countries could be expected to be less competitive and less interested in school choice than their contemporaries in the Southern European countries and Australia. As family has been a central actor in the conservative welfare state model in general and especially in the Southern European countries with their Catholic heritage, the effects of family could be expected to be emphasised more in Spain and Portugal.

Data, measurement, backgrounds

Data and methods. Similar data sets were gathered approximately simultaneously in Australia, Finland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden during the months of January and February 2000. Essentially the same questionnaire was used in each country.[2] The survey questionnaire consisted of 27 sets of questions, each set containing 1–16 questions. The data file totalled approximately 140 dependent variables and 15 background variables. The questions concerned, among other things, the young people's opinions on education in general and on the characteristics of the ideal pupil, on the one hand, and on the qualities needed in working life on the other. Opinions concerning internationalisation and globalisation, more specifically the EU (except in Australia), were also mapped, as were thoughts about work, politics and the family. The final data file had 3008 cases altogether (Finland 567, Sweden 413, Spain 788, Portugal 605 and Australia 635). There were some differences in the way in which the national surveys were executed. Special education in the form of special schools was not included in the survey, which could be considered something of a shortcoming. Hence, we are dealing with a comparison of the opinions of pupils attaining regular education in the year 2000.

Some might argue that the kind of research themes and theoretical concepts discussed in the book are too complicated for youths to fully understand. However, no complex concepts were used in the actual questionnaire, and the research themes were reduced to fairly simple questions, which were in our estimation quite comprehensible by the youths. The developmental level of 15–16-year-old youths should also not be underestimated, although some of the themes were not yet topical for the youths. They were still in school, and many of them would probably continue schooling for several years. They were, of course, not yet economically independent and had no long-term work

[2] In Australia the questionnaire had to be moulded to some extent, to correspond with the exceptional cultural and geo-political circumstances. In the Finnish questionnaire the word *outlook* in the item "Appropriate outlook and habits" in the question "How important are the following qualities for success in working life?" was translated incorrectly, with a word referring to *appearance* (Fin. ulkoinen olemus), while in English the word is synonymous with *attitude or way of thinking*.

experience. Not being in working life does not mean, however, that the youths could not have any opinions on such a central issue as work, for example. The same applies to political opinions.

TABLE 2. **Short descriptions of how the data was collected.**

– The Australian data was collected in south-eastern and southern Australia. The State of New South Wales was represented by two schools, while three schools in both Victoria and South Australia participated in the survey. Geographically, Australia is fairly well represented in the sample, although neither of the Australian Territories (Northern Territory and Capital Territory) nor Western Australia was. Schools were selected to include all types of schools, a good cross-cut of socio-economic backgrounds, and students from both rural and urban settings.
– The Finnish data was collected in five schools in the city of Turku, thus roughly representing the 9th-grade pupils of in the city. Turku is one of the major cities of Finland, located on the south-western coast. Because the sample was gathered in one city, it can hardly be claimed to be statistically representative of the whole country, but we could hypothesise that Turku does not differ significantly from the country's other major cities. Social differences in comparison to Eastern and Northern Finland may quite well be larger.
– The Portuguese survey was carried out in seven schools, four of which are located in the capital region, Lisbon, and the remaining three in Portalegre, Almada and Paços de Ferreira. Lisbon and Almada are situated in the centre of the country on the Western coast, Paços de Ferreira is on the coast in the north-west, while Portalegre is located in the south of the country. Of the seven schools, four were so-called PIET (Priority Intervention Educational Territories) schools.
– In Sweden the data was collected in regions representing three areas: urban advantaged, urban disadvantaged and rural disadvantaged. Data collection was strongly influence by the idea of geographical and social segregation. Altogether six schools were involved.
– In Spain the survey was conducted in Andalusia and in the Canary Islands, with a total of 15 schools participating in the study. Regions with fairly low economic resources were deliberately selected, on the assumption that social inequality would be more noticeable.

Another possible validity problem is related to the translation of the questionnaire into the different languages (Swedish, Finnish, Portuguese and Spanish). The aim was to make the case studies as comparable as possible, and an almost identical questionnaire was used in each country. There are several issues which cannot be fully controlled in this kind of a study, however. One is an issue which often has to be confronted in longitudinal studies within any single country, as well: the meaning of the questions may vary in different contexts. Also, admittedly sometimes even small variations in the formulation of the questions may lead to somewhat different results.

All the case studies are mainly based on cross-tabulations, but there is some variation in the methods used in the articles. In the Finnish article, straight distributions and cross-tabulations are used with individual questions. In some cases, indexes (composite variables) are constructed with the help of factor analysis[3] and reliability analysis, using Cronbach's Alpha[4]. The means of the indexes are then examined in the categories of certain important background variables. In the Swedish and in the Spanish articles only cross-tabulations are reported. In the Portuguese case, the methods used in the analysis are factor analysis[5], cluster analysis, t-test and cross-tabulation. In the Australian article, factor analysis is used in the preparation of composite variables, in addition to which cross-tabulation is used.

Naturally, the choice of a quantitative approach has various consequences. On the one hand, it makes possible a fairly accurate comparison between the countries, although admittedly the interpretations of the same questions may vary to some extent in different contexts, as acknowledged earlier. Despite this, the advantage of the survey method is that the data covers a great number of people, and thus the results can be fairly well generalised. Some of what is gained

[3] All the solutions in the Finnish article are Varimax-rotated, and the extraction method used in the factor analyses is Principal Components Analysis.

[4] Cronbach's Alpha is a measure of internal consistency, based on correlation between the variables. The higher the value, the better the variables fit together to form a scale. Usually values around 0,7 are considered to indicate good reliability.

[5] Principal Components Analysis and Varimax rotation were used in the factor analysis, just as in the Finnish case. In addition, the KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) test is employed. KMO is a statistical test that tests the correlations among the components.

in the richness and comparability of information is lost in the depth of information. The survey method cannot naturally reach the detail and depth attainable through qualitative methods. However, the same general themes discussed in this book have also been approached with more theoretical (Popkewitz 1999) and more qualitative (Lindblad & Popkewitz 2001a; 2001b) methods within the EGSIE-project.

Our approach can be described as structural: various factors related to the family background, such as parents' education and socio-economic status, are quite strongly emphasised in the analysis. Such factors as residential area or the effect of school are generally not given as much emphasis in the book. However, there are some exceptions to this rule. For example, the Swedish study does clearly emphasise the importance of residential areas, and in the Portuguese study the differences between schools are examined and the school effect is discussed. Our general intent in the book is not to deny the possible effects of schooling, but studying the school effect thoroughly would require a separate analysis. Based on prior empirical research, it is also not altogether clear to what extent schooling in itself has an effect on youths. For example Meyer (1970, 68), while studying the effects of school on college intentions, found the effect to be primarily due to the social-class composition of schools. Later Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore (1982) argued that, in the American context, there were considerable differences between private and public schools in pupils' achievements. This argument was again contrasted among others by Alexander and Pallas (1985), who found that the school effect disappeared when other background factors were controlled for.

Pupils' social backgrounds. The data sets in question were strictly speaking not perfectly statistically representative of the countries, as the data was collected from schools in selected regions of each country. However, it is possible to assess to what extent the background variables of the given samples correspond to the distributions in the real world. The first variable to be examined is the parents' educational attainments in the samples, compared to the general statistical data. The variable measured is the proportion of parents in each country-wise sample who had completed at least upper-secondary education, compared to



FIGURE 1. **Educational levels compared: populations vs. samples. Adults/parents having completed at least upper-secondary education (%).**

the same figures in the official statistics for adults roughly the same age as the sampled youths' parents. The definition of upper-secondary education includes both high-school and vocational education. Two age categories are given in Figure 1 for reference. The data for the populations are from a comparative OECD publication (Education at a Glance 2000, 35).

As the figure shows, the educational levels within the samples correspond fairly well with the general-population data. We have to remember, however, that the statistical data on the populations dates from 1998, after which time the general educational level has risen slightly in each country. This helps to account for the somewhat higher educational levels in the Portuguese, Spanish and Australian samples compared to the general population. On the other hand, in the cases of Finland and Sweden, the fairly low education levels in the sample are partly explained by the high incidence of "no response" replies to questions concerning parental education. The missing values were taken into account in the calculations.

The second variable to be examined is unemployment. The general-population data was obtained from the national statistics, while a variable depicting the unemployment rate had to be constructed for the samples.



FIGURE 2. **Unemployment rates in the populations[6] and in the samples compared (%).**

This variable was the mean unemployment rates among the respondents' mothers and fathers. As shown in *Figure 2*, the unemployment rate was conspicuously low in the Spanish sample, being only around 4 percent, especially considering that half of it was collected in Andalusia, where unemployment exceeds the national average. The sample appears to be quite biased in this sense. The same applies to a somewhat lesser extent to Australia, whereas in the Swedish sample the unemployment rate was actually higher than in the population on average.

As shown in *Figure 3*, there were large differences in family structure. Spain and Portugal had the highest proportions of "normal" families, in other words two-parent families with a father and a mother. "Normal" refers here to statistical prevalence and is not intended to carry any value judgements. "Atypical" refers to any other kind of family. Atypical families are the most common in Finland and Australia, accounting for close to 1/3 of all families (see the figure).

[6] Australia: May 2000 (The Australian Bureau of Statistics), Finland: January-February 2000 (Statistics Finland/Tilastokeskus), Portugal: 1st quarter of 2000 (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica), Spain: 2nd quarter of 2000 (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica), Sweden: August 2000 (Statistics Sweden/Statistiska Centralbyrån).



FIGURE 3. Family type: percentages by country.

The next question concerns the educational level of the pupils' fathers in the countries in question (*Figure 4*). The proportions of fathers with only basic education on the one hand, and those with a university education on the other, are examined. Overall, the educational level was highest in Sweden (see the figure) and lowest in Portugal. The highest proportions of fathers with no post-compulsory education were in the South-European countries and Australia, and the corresponding figures in the Nordic countries were clearly lower. The proportions of university-educated fathers were also the highest in the Nordic countries.



FIGURE 4. Father's education by country: the two extremes (%).



FIGURE 5. **The percentages of first-generation (born abroad) and second-generation migrants (both parents born abroad), and of those with a foreign mother tongue, by country.**

Figure 5, not surprisingly, shows that the Australian sample had the largest proportion of second-generation immigrants, around 14 percent, defined as Australian-born youths whose parents were born abroad. However, in terms of immigrant pupils, Australia comes second to Sweden: 22 per cent of the respondents in the Swedish sample were immigrants. The Spanish sample was ethnically the most homogenous, followed by Finland.

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